Meta, Signal and Tailscale tell Canadian senators Bill C-22 would force them to build surveillance tools
Executives from Meta, Signal and the Toronto-based networking firm Tailscale testified before a Senate committee in Ottawa on Monday that Canada's lawful-access bill would compel them to weaken encryption or retain user data they do not want to hold, intensifying a monthslong standoff between Ottawa and the tech industry.

Executives from Meta, the encrypted-messaging app Signal and the Toronto-based networking company Tailscale told a Senate committee in Ottawa on Monday that a federal bill moving through Parliament would force them to build government surveillance capabilities into their products or retain Canadian users' data against their own security practices. The hearing, held by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, is the latest flashpoint in an eight-month fight between Ottawa and the technology industry over Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, which passed the House of Commons in June and is now before the Senate.
The bill would let the federal public safety minister issue confidential orders compelling "core" service providers, as well as individual companies singled out by name, to build and maintain technical capabilities that let police and intelligence services obtain electronic evidence. A separate section would allow regulations forcing companies to retain certain user metadata, originally for up to a year; the House trimmed that ceiling to six months before passage, and any individual retention order is now capped at two years and requires sign-off from Canada's intelligence commissioner. The legislation states it does not compel a company to decrypt data unless that company itself holds the encryption key, but it also bars only vulnerabilities that create a "systemic" risk under recognized international technical standards — a definition that Meta, Signal and allied privacy researchers say is still too narrow to protect end-to-end encryption.
What the companies told senators
Signal's vice president for strategy and global affairs, Udbhav Tiwari, told the committee that compliance would "fundamentally break Signal," reiterating a position the company has held since testifying before the House earlier this year that it would leave the Canadian market rather than weaken its encryption for any government. Meta's Canadian public-policy representatives, Rachel Curran and Robyn Greene, argued that the bill's Part 2 provisions would "conscript private companies into service as an arm of the government's surveillance apparatus." In a formal submission posted to its newsroom, Meta states flatly that "it is not possible to build backdoors to encrypted systems for law enforcement without creating vulnerabilities" that criminals and hostile states can also exploit, and the company says the bill's current language, combined with ministerial orders that can override implementing regulations, leaves that risk open.
Tailscale, whose remote-access software is used by businesses to connect devices without routing traffic through a central data center, sent chief executive Avery Pennarun, who told the committee the company would have to weigh what its customers are willing to accept if obligated to build standing access tools it does not currently maintain. The company made a similar argument in a company blog post published in May, arguing that "the safest database is the one you never created" and that mandating new logging or retention infrastructure turns data minimization — a security best practice — into a regulatory liability. Roughly 40% of Tailscale's global staff is based in Canada, according to reporting on the hearing.
"It is not possible to build backdoors to encrypted systems for law enforcement without creating vulnerabilities" that malicious actors can exploit, Meta told Canadian lawmakers in its formal submission on the bill.
Why Ottawa wants the powers
Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree has said the bill was never intended to force companies to break encryption and that law enforcement agencies say the current retention periods are necessary because digital evidence frequently sits with a provider for months before investigators identify its relevance. Government officials have repeatedly pointed to the "Salt Typhoon" espionage campaign, in which Chinese state-linked hackers reportedly reached call and text metadata belonging to more than a million people in the United States, and to a February 2025 incident in which three devices on Canadian telecom networks were found to have been compromised, as evidence that lawful, accountable access mechanisms are preferable to ad hoc or insecure ones. Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne, who appeared before the same Senate committee on November 2, did not call for the bill to be withdrawn but recommended "targeted amendments to the bill to help ensure the appropriate balance" between law enforcement needs and Canadians' privacy rights.
Civil liberties groups have taken a harder line. The University of Toronto–based Citizen Lab and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association have both argued that the metadata-retention regime, which authorizes orders without a judicial warrant, is likely unconstitutional, and the Canadian Bar Association has disputed the government's framing that the bill merely brings Canada in line with its intelligence-sharing partners in the Five Eyes alliance, calling that comparison "only partly true." Apple and Google, which testified before the House committee earlier this year rather than the Senate, have separately asked Parliament to require judicial — rather than purely executive — review before any order that could compel changes to encryption.
Who is affected, and what comes next
At least 20 technology companies and industry associations wrote to federal ministers in September urging further amendments, according to reporting on Monday's hearing, and several smaller privacy-focused firms — including the VPN providers NordVPN, Windscribe and DuckDuckGo's VPN service — have said they would withdraw specific products or operations from Canada rather than comply with the bill as written. Canadian privacy law scholars have warned that compliance costs could also be passed on to ordinary subscribers through higher prices for telecom and messaging services. Beyond the named companies, the dispute touches any Canadian business or consumer that relies on encrypted communications, cloud storage or VPN services for routine security, since providers say the bill's broadest ministerial-order powers could in principle reach non-core companies as well as the major carriers.
Monday's committee session, which ran in three panels through the evening — academics and legal scholars first, followed by civil liberties and Indigenous data-governance groups, then the industry witnesses from Meta, Signal, Tailscale and the cybersecurity firm Beauceron Security — is part of an ongoing Senate study that began with second reading on October 22. The committee has not set a date to report the bill back to the full Senate, and industry observers tracking the file say report stage and third reading are unlikely before the new year. If passed in its current form, most of the bill's Part 1 provisions would take effect 180 days after royal assent, while the more contested Part 2 powers would only come into force on a date set later by cabinet order — leaving room, lobbyists on both sides say, for further amendment before any obligations actually bind the companies now objecting to them.

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