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Opinion: A Ukraine Peace Deal Negotiated Without Its Guarantors Will Not Hold

The latest round of US-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi excluded the European governments that would have to pay for and enforce any peace. That is not a detail — it is the design flaw most likely to doom the outcome.

PW
By PressTemps World DeskPublished November 13, 2026 · 7 min read
Opinion: A Ukraine Peace Deal Negotiated Without Its Guarantors Will Not Hold
Emirates Palace in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, which has hosted successive rounds of the US-mediated Russia-Ukraine talks since January 2026. (Photo: Chris Down/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0)
What to know
US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine resumed in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, 2026, the first round in nine months, with Washington, Moscow and Kyiv as the only parties at the table
Zelenskyy and Rubio did not attend in person; European governments met separately beforehand and were excluded from the trilateral sessions despite having pledged troops and funding for any post-war security guarantee
Russia launched 162 drones and a ballistic missile at Ukraine overnight during the first day of talks, with Ukrainian air defenses downing or suppressing 135 of them
A Congressional Research Service report shows NATO allies have funneled over $4.1 billion through a US weapons-purchase program for Ukraine even as Washington says future support must rely less on US contributions

The United States, Russia and Ukraine spent two days this week in Abu Dhabi negotiating the outline of a settlement to a war now in its fifth year, and by most accounts the sessions were substantive. What should trouble anyone hoping the result lasts is who was kept out of the room. The round that opened Tuesday was, by design, trilateral — Washington, Moscow and Kyiv only — the same format the United Arab Emirates' foreign ministry has described consistently since it began hosting the process in January, with no European government named among the participants. Europe's governments, which would have to fund, police and in some scenarios fight to uphold any guarantee that comes out of this process, were left to coordinate in an anteroom down the hall.

That arrangement is not a procedural footnote. It is close to the central design flaw in the diplomacy now underway, and it has drawn far less scrutiny than it deserves amid relief that Russian and Ukrainian negotiators are talking again after a nine-month pause.

A Trilateral Table, a Multilateral War

Tuesday's session ran about four hours, with Ukraine's delegation led by Rustem Umerov and Russia's by Vladimir Medinsky, flanked by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff for the United States and NATO's top military commander, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich. Neither President Volodymyr Zelenskyy nor Secretary of State Marco Rubio attended in person. A second day of talks followed Wednesday. The agenda, by the negotiators' own description, covered prisoner exchanges, the return of children taken from Ukraine, and the architecture of security guarantees meant to deter Russia from attacking again — precisely the subjects on which European governments have the most at stake and the least say. Rubio, speaking from the G7 meeting in Paris rather than Abu Dhabi, called the talks "very productive" but cautioned that "a lot of work" remained. Zelenskyy, who had floated hopes in Berlin a week earlier of the talks opening a path to a face-to-face meeting with Vladimir Putin, described the session as "constructive and quite substantive." Russia, for its part, has told the Kremlin's counterparts that it will not accept direct European participation in the three-way sessions, though it has left open the possibility of European involvement "at a later stage" — a concession that costs Moscow nothing, since it comes after the terms have already been set.

Diplomacy did not pause the war it is meant to end. Ukraine's air force reported that Russia launched 162 attack drones and a ballistic missile overnight as the talks were underway, with air defenses downing or suppressing 135 of them and strikes landing at nineteen locations. That is not an aberration; it has been the pattern through three prior rounds of this same process since January, none of which produced a signed agreement. A negotiating partner that escalates while negotiating is telling its counterparts something about how much weight to put on the word "ceasefire" once one is finally signed.

Consultation Is Not the Same as a Seat

European officials have not been invisible in this process. Representatives from France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the European Union and NATO met with Ukraine's delegation in Abu Dhabi before the trilateral session began, and a separate round of coordination took place in Brussels in early November on the shape of post-war security guarantees. But coordinating with the parties who control the final text is a different thing from being one of them, and Brussels' own trade press has not minced words about the distinction: the European Union, one outlet reported bluntly, sent a team to Abu Dhabi "without a seat at the table." That gap matters because of what Europe has already been asked to commit. A joint statement issued by EU and NATO-member leaders in mid-December 2025 pledged a "European-led multinational force" to help secure Ukraine's skies and seas after a settlement, sustained funding to keep Ukraine's armed forces at roughly 800,000 personnel, and a "legally binding commitment" to restore peace should Russia attack again. Those same leaders declared that "international borders must not be changed by force" and that decisions on Ukrainian territory belong to Ukrainians — a principle now being tested in a room they cannot enter.

"International borders must not be changed by force."

The financial logic compounds the political one. A Congressional Research Service report on the state of the diplomacy notes that NATO allies have funneled more than $4.1 billion through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List to buy American-made weapons for Ukraine, on top of the roughly $400 million in direct U.S. security assistance Congress approved for fiscal 2026 — assistance the administration has insisted "must not rely on significant U.S. contributions" going forward, a polite way of saying Europe should pay more even as it negotiates less. Zelenskyy, for his part, has told European counterparts Ukraine will need an additional €70 billion from them next year alone. The people being asked to write the largest checks are not the people drafting the terms those checks are meant to enforce.

The Case for the Small Table, and Its Limits

There is a real argument for keeping the trilateral format narrow, and it deserves to be taken seriously rather than waved away. Multilateral negotiations with dozens of stakeholders tend toward paralysis; the Oslo-to-Minsk history of European-brokered Ukraine diplomacy is not an advertisement for large committees. Moscow has also made clear it regards European involvement as an attempt to stiffen Ukraine's position with outside pressure, and refusing to negotiate at all rather than negotiate narrowly is the likelier alternative if the format were forced open. Washington can reasonably claim that a deal struck quickly among the three belligerent-adjacent parties, with European input folded in afterward on the specific guarantees Europe is being asked to provide, is more achievable than one negotiated by committee from the outset.

That argument has merit as a tactic. It fails as a theory of durability. A security guarantee is not a provision like a prisoner exchange, where speed and discretion carry real value; it is a long-term commitment that only works if the parties expected to honor it — chiefly the European governments supplying the troops, money and political will — were present when its terms were set and therefore have genuine ownership of it. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Minsk I and Minsk II all collapsed in part because the states expected to enforce them had not meaningfully shaped their terms, or because the terms themselves assumed a good faith that the subsequent conduct of the parties did not bear out. A framework negotiated primarily by Washington, with Moscow's sign-off and Kyiv's consent, then handed to European capitals as a bill to pay and a force to supply, risks repeating that history rather than correcting it.

What Should Follow

None of this argues for slowing the talks or for treating Tuesday's session with anything but cautious welcome; ending the killing sooner rather than later is its own overriding good, and nine months of silence between the parties served no one. It argues instead that the structure of the next rounds needs to change before, not after, any framework is finalized. European governments should be formal co-signatories of whatever security-guarantee architecture emerges, not downstream approvers of a text drafted without them, and Congress — which the Congressional Research Service notes will have to weigh continued funding, sanctions policy and the alliance implications of all this — should insist on that condition explicitly rather than ratify financial commitments after the fact. With a possible Trump-Putin-Xi encounter on the sidelines of the APEC summit in mid-November and a G20 gathering in Florida in December, there will be ample opportunity to correct course. Peace agreements that the guarantors did not negotiate are the kind that tend not to survive contact with the next crisis. The United States has a chance, in the weeks ahead, to avoid building another one.

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