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Opinion: Trump's summit with Xi and Putin should not shut Ukraine out of the room

As Donald Trump prepares for the first-ever trilateral meeting between the leaders of the United States, China and Russia at the APEC summit in Shenzhen, Washington's decision to keep Ukraine off the agenda treats the war's outcome as a matter for great powers alone.

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By PressTemps Editorial BoardPublished Today, 04:50 ET · 7 min read
Opinion: Trump's summit with Xi and Putin should not shut Ukraine out of the room
File photo: Vladimir Putin attends the virtual APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in November 2020. He is due to meet Presidents Trump and Xi at this year's APEC summit in Shenzhen. Photo: The Presidential Press and Information Office / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0
What to know
The White House confirmed on November 13, 2026 that Trump will hold the first-ever trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on November 18-19 at the APEC summit in Shenzhen, with nuclear arms reduction as the stated focus and Ukraine explicitly excluded from the agenda.
New START, the last binding US-Russia nuclear arms treaty, expired February 5, 2026 with no successor, which UN Secretary-General Guterres called a "grave moment" in an official UN statement the same day.
Ukrainian officials, including President Zelensky and Foreign Minister Sybiha, have publicly objected to a US-Russia-China format that excludes Kyiv, with Sybiha arguing it would encourage Russia to continue the war.
Trump told reporters in October 2026 that a trilateral meeting would not be "for Ukraine's sake" and that Russia "has been fine on Ukraine," remarks made the same week as a Russian strike that killed six people in a Kyiv park.

When Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin sit down together on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen this week, it will be the first time the sitting leaders of the United States, China and Russia have ever held a trilateral meeting. That alone would justify close attention. What should worry anyone who cares about how wars end is what the White House has already signaled about the agenda: nuclear arms reduction is in, and Ukraine, according to senior US officials, is explicitly out. Washington should not hold a summit that implicitly treats the fate of a sovereign country at war as a subject too delicate for the country waging the war to discuss, while leaving the country being invaded out of the room entirely.

What is actually being planned

The broad outlines are confirmed, even if the details remain fluid. China's foreign ministry has set the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting for November 18-19 in Shenzhen, and the White House confirmed on November 13 that Trump will use the trip to hold a joint session with Xi and Putin afterward. American officials have said the centerpiece will be a conversation about reducing nuclear weapons, a priority Trump has pushed before: a White House fact sheet from September's state visit already states that "the President advocated for trilateral arms control negotiations between the United States, Russia, and China." But the same officials have said, on the record in multiple outlets, that Ukraine will not be part of the trilateral discussion, because Washington considers it a separate diplomatic track. Asked in October about a possible three-way summit, Trump said he was open to one but that it would not be "for Ukraine's sake," adding that "Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine. They haven't been doing much." The remarks, reported by the Kyiv Independent, came the same week as a Russian strike on a Kyiv park that killed six people, an attack Trump did not address when asked about it.

Why the nuclear agenda is legitimate, and urgent

None of this is to dismiss the substance of what the three leaders may actually discuss. The last treaty limiting American and Russian nuclear arsenals, New START, lapsed on February 5, 2026, leaving the two countries without binding numerical caps on deployed warheads for the first time since the early 1970s. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called the lapse a "grave moment" for international peace and security in an official statement the same day, warning that the risk of nuclear weapons use was "the highest in decades" and urging Washington and Moscow "to return to the negotiating table without delay and to agree upon a successor framework." Secretary of State Marco Rubio has separately argued that any new agreement needs to include China's rapidly expanding arsenal, since a purely bilateral US-Russia framework no longer reflects where nuclear risk is concentrated. A three-way conversation among the only three countries with globally significant strategic arsenals is, on its own terms, overdue and worth having.

Why excluding Ukraine is still the wrong call

The trouble is that "we're not discussing Ukraine" is not a neutral act when the person sitting across the table is the man who ordered the invasion, and the person who isn't there is the one defending against it. Ukraine's government has said as much directly. President Zelensky has said the three leaders have every right to meet, but not the right to decide Ukraine's future without Kyiv at the table, and Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha went further, arguing publicly that a US-Russia-China summit "would only encourage Putin to continue this war," while a format that put Ukraine, the US and Russia in the same room instead could plausibly speed an end to it. The distinction the administration is drawing, between a "nuclear" track that excludes Ukraine and a separate "peace" track that presumably includes it eventually, assumes those tracks can be kept cleanly apart. They cannot. Any serious conversation about reducing nuclear risk with Russia happens against the backdrop of a Russian war of territorial conquest that is still underway, and presenting Putin with a seat at a historic first-ever trilateral table, structured around an agenda he finds comfortable, is a diplomatic reward whether or not the war is formally mentioned.

  • February 5, 2026: New START, the last binding US-Russia nuclear arms treaty, expires with no successor in place.
  • September 2026: The White House states that Trump has pushed for trilateral arms-control talks among the US, Russia and China.
  • November 13, 2026: The White House confirms the first-ever Trump-Xi-Putin trilateral meeting, officials say Ukraine is not on its agenda.
  • November 18-19, 2026: The APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, and the trilateral session, take place in Shenzhen.

There is a reasonable counter-argument here, and it deserves a fair hearing. Diplomacy routinely proceeds on parallel, narrower tracks precisely because trying to solve everything in one room solves nothing; arms control negotiators have long argued that bundling unrelated disputes into a single negotiation is how talks collapse. A trilateral session limited to strategic stability, the argument goes, might be the only format in which Putin would show up at all, and getting him into a room with Trump and Xi, on any subject, keeps a channel open that could later be used for Ukraine. There is also precedent: nuclear risk-reduction talks between Washington and Moscow continued through the depths of the Cold War's hottest regional proxy wars, on the theory that preventing a global catastrophe was a distinct and more urgent interest than resolving every regional one.

That argument would be more persuasive if the administration were pairing the nuclear track with a clearly scheduled, parallel Ukraine track involving Kyiv directly, and if Trump's own public comments did not keep signaling, as they did in October, a casual dismissiveness about Ukraine's position that undercuts any claim that the tracks are being kept separate out of diplomatic discipline rather than indifference. Sequencing matters in optics as much as substance: holding history's first US-China-Russia summit, with fanfare, while the actual party to the ongoing war receives no comparable platform, tells every government watching, including smaller states with their own border disputes, that major-power conversations happen among major powers and everyone else waits outside.

What should happen instead

None of this requires canceling the Shenzhen talks. Arms control conversations with the only two other nuclear-armed powers of comparable scale are worth pursuing on their own merits, and Guterres is right that the current vacuum is dangerous. But the administration should pair the trilateral with a concrete, publicly announced commitment to a near-term US-Ukraine-Russia session, not an open-ended promise of a "separate track" with no date attached, so that the sequencing does not read as Ukraine being an afterthought to a more glamorous great-power photo opportunity. Congress, which retains oversight leverage through aid and sanctions legislation, should press the State Department publicly for that date before the Shenzhen meeting takes place, not after. And American officials, starting with the president, should stop making public remarks that minimize Russian responsibility for a war that is still killing civilians, since those remarks are heard in Kyiv, in Moscow and in Beijing as signals about how seriously Washington takes its own stated commitment to a peace that includes Ukraine's voice.

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